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EDWARD FRIEDMAN
Completed during her final battle with cancer, this book by the pre-eminent American diplomatic historian of PRC era USA-PRC rela-tions, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, is a superb study of Eisenhower era
Washington-Beijing relations. She finds that President Eisenhower, Ike, erred
when he concluded that political forces in his Republican Party, the U.S.
Congress and American public opinion made it impossible for him to act on
his personal views that a constructive approach to Mao’s China was prefer-
able to an unsustainable policy of trying to isolate a stable CCP regime from
international organisations and trade.
For Tucker, Ike should have educated the American public to understand
that a powerful PRC was here to stay and also should have made overtures
to Mao toward normalising relations. Tucker will not accept what her data
establishes, that American politics blocked such policies. 
Tucker challenges myths about Eisenhower’s policy on the PRC. Her
archival digging and interviews with key American actors undermine the
story that Ike’s successor, John Kennedy, could not open to China because
Ike had threatened to rally the people against Kennedy attempting such an
opening. Tucker shows that Eisenhower actually wished to end the doomed
policy of trying to isolate the PRC.
“The China Threat” also clarifies why the Eisenhower administration got
so many things wrong about China. Tucker details why the U.S. administra-
tion would not believe the data showing a Moscow-Beijing split and how
the administration wrongly saw Mao’s economically irrational policies as
Liberation Army. Selection methods have become increasingly competitive,
consisting of written and oral examinations evaluated by cadres drawn from
different departments in order to avoid personal collusion. “Informal” prac-
tices are resorted to at the candidates’ pre-selection stage, when only three
are considered for each post. Personal links become crucial, as candidates
need to be recommended by an officer. According to You Ji, officers conve-
niently pick those in their own combat units or from the same province.
The next two contributions deal with provincial elites. Bo Zhiyue charts
the careers of 31 provincial Party secretaries and governors as of November
2012, showing that the tendency is towards a relatively strict adherence to
age limits as well as qualification levels for posts as heads of provinces. He
notes the need for varied experience in different sectors in order to be
named a provincial secretary. While Bo also describes the cadres’ supposed
factional attachments, he fails to explain what effect they could have in
practice, or possible changes.
In the second chapter devoted to provincial elites, S. Philip Hsu and Jhih-
wei Shao evaluate the level of meritocracy in the cadre promotion system.
Their analysis relies on dates, including all provincial Party secretaries and
governors between 1993 and 2010. Contrary to previous studies, they show
that work experience at the central level is generally not a good indicator
for promotion to the top rung in a province, but rather is a sign of approach-
ing retirement. At the same time, the authors show that provincial chiefs
are evaluated via a complex system taking into account their short-term
economic performance in deciding whether they can keep their post, but
also their cumulative results over the long term, compared with their pred-
ecessors, in considering them for promotion.
The book’s last two chapters are devoted to specific elite types: state en-
terprise managers and cadres rising through the CCP Youth League. In each
case, the authors seek to measure the effect of this experience on their fu-
ture careers. Chih-shian Liou and Chung-min Tsai describe the CCP’s control
over major state enterprises via the selection and promotion of their man-
agers and find that those who are aligned with the Party-state’s agenda are
promoted. In their view, the effects on future careers vary according to in-
dustrial sectors. Liou and Tsai, for instance, show that in electrical industry,
promotions take place mainly within the sector, but that in the more strate-
gic oil sector, managers can hope for political posts with great responsibility
following their industrial careers.
In the last chapter, Chien-wen Kou deals with the careers of cadres who
worked in the Communist Youth League after 1978. Charting the careers of
293 individuals, he notes the importance of this promotion channel, point-
ing out its two main features. First, few former Youth League cadres hold
technical or economic ministerial posts, indicating that the League consists
of generalists. Then again, League experience gives them an age advantage,
helping them get important posts while still young compared to other
cadres – a major career advantage. Apart from these two factors, Kou notes
that the rapid and numerous promotions of former League cadres is also
due to the organisation’s strong links with key Party figures such as Hu
Yaobang in the 1980s, then with Hu Jintao and later Li Keqiang. While the
argumentation seems sound, might Kou not have overplayed the role of the
organisation’s internal network and by extension the unity of the faction
at issue? As he has himself notes, the selection of the League’s cadres at all
levels rests with CCP organs and not with the organisation itself, calling into
question the homogeneity of its recruitment.
To conclude, Choosing China’s Leaders should interest all readers curious
about the process of selecting Chinese political elites. It has the classical
lacuna of collective works in that issues raised in the introduction are only
partially addressed in the chapters that make up the book. More generally,
while the book has on the whole focused on the interaction between the
Party’s growing institutionalisation and the persistence of entrenched fac-
tions, this separation between policies seen as “formal” or “informal” has
not been addressed. The question might well arise whether their constant
interaction does not challenge this dichotomy. Personal relations also tend
to be treated as a given, without proper questioning of the mechanisms ex-
plaining their development and persistence. A more dynamic approach to
these networks would thus be welcome for a clearer understanding of pro-
motion mechanisms in the Chinese Party-state.
z Translated by N. Jayaram.
z Jérôme Doyon is PhD candidate in political science at
SciencesPo/CERI, Paris, and Columbia University, New York
( Jd2988@columbia.edu).
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somehow making the PRC a successful industrial moderniser. Tucker also
finds that Washington was blinded both by Eurocentric presuppositions and
an inability to appreciate “the force of decolonialization or third world na-
tionalism” (p. 27).
Tucker reveals that Ike was more worried about war prone forces in the
Chiang Kai-shek government on Taiwan than by such forces in the PRC.
Eisenhower “worried about Chiang Kai-shek’s ability to plunge the United
States into an unwanted war” (p. 15); “Dulles believed that Chiang would
not hesitate to incite World War III...” (p. 29); Dulles “blunted Nationalist
efforts to provoke Beijing” (p. 30). In contrast, Mao was “extremely cautious”
(p. 21). Although Dulles “collaborated with Dean Rusk to drive the Gener-
alissimo from power” in 1950 (p. 26), Tucker concludes that the Ike-Dulles
administration did not try to topple Chiang. But part of the resolution to
the 1958 crisis in the Taiwan Strait may have been Chiang Kai-shek pulling
way back from provocative incursions into the PRC in return for the USA
ending its efforts to replace Chiang.
Tucker finds that by 1953, the Mao leadership no longer saw the U.S. as a
military threat (pp. 57-58). She dismisses Mao’s language welcoming nu-
clear war as the “rhetoric” of “self-protection” (p. 59). Nehru experienced
Mao’s declarations as madness. In fact, Mao recklessly self-isolated China,
alienating Russia, India, and numerous others.
Tucker offers rich data on the two 1950s crises in the Taiwan Strait. Her
data persuades me that the CCP leaders, after a century of war and chaos,
wanted to modernise China. They therefore had to push Chiang’s forces off
islands all the way north to Shanghai, islands that blockaded Chinese ports
and prevented trade with the world. “China’s southeast coast had been suf-
fering the effects of a Nationalist Chinese blockade...” (p. 87). The PRC
sought talks with the U.S. to “tackle trade” (p. 97). “China wanted to buy
goods which were better made than the Russian variety and send students
to the United States” (p. 98). The PRC wanted to end the U.S. “trade em-
bargo” (p. 99).
In 1954-5, Chinese attacks were meant to end the Chiang blockade of the
PRC. That is, CCP “goals were limited” (p. 97). China “was not... prepared to
attack Taiwan” (pp. 75-77). “Mao stressed that PLA forces should at no point
engage the Americans directly” (p. 77). Because Eisenhower responded by
getting Chiang off the islands used for the blockade, “Mao concluded that
Washington wanted so desperately to avoid war...” (p. 79). In like manner,
“Eisenhower doubted that the Chinese Communists wanted to risk war” 
(p. 82). 
When Mao instigated another crisis in 1958 by ordering the shelling of
the offshore islands of Jinmen and Mazu, once again Eisenhower and Mao
“both sought to avoid a military collision” (p. 139). Mao sought to create
a crisis atmosphere to facilitate the mobilisation of villagers into gargan-
tuan collectives euphemistically dubbed communes (p. 158) and to display
his own ability to manage the Americans in the interest of wars of national
liberation as Khrushchev’s policy of peaceful coexistence and detente sup-
posedly could not. Jinmen and Mazu “were of no military value” (p. 149).
Mao’s irresponsible playing at war alienated Moscow (p. 169). Mao
boasted that he was keeping Ike and Khrushchev “scurrying,” something
“wonderful” (p. 149). Mao’s recklessness forced Ike to spend a lot of political
capital beating back American hawks and Chiang, both of whom sought to
use Mao’s provocations to legitimate a war against the PRC. Once again,
Mao saw that the American president sought peace (p. 148). The U.S. in-
tensified pressure on Chiang to “cease commando raids... and efforts to
blockade mainland ports” (p. 157). 
But Tucker errs when she forgets Mao’s domestic and international agenda
and places the crises in an alleged context of “China’s yearning for unifica-
tion” (p. 157). There is no data on such “yearnings.” In fact, Mao never fix-
ated on Taiwan, an island that was not part of Chinese nationalist
consciousness before 1942. 
The author similarly errs in lending credence to the CCP narrative that
“The Chinese understood the humiliation of exploitation by the West, 
having endured a century of semicolonialism and near national extinction”
(p. 47). Actually, the last dynasty, the Qing, more than doubled the size of
territory controlled by the Sinicized Ming, annexing huge swathes of non-
Sinicized territories. Subsequently, the Han CCP has threatened national ex-
tinction for Manchu, Mongol, Tibetan, and Uyghur communities. The Han,
through a policy known as “settler colonialism,” now pervade the territories
of these peoples. The post-Mao myth that the Mongol and Manchu invaders
had somehow re-united China and that the Han who resisted the invaders
were splitists is a rhetoric that legitimates Chinese revanchism, as does the
narrative about a century of humiliation.
For Mao, the nation stealing the most land hitherto conquered by the 
militarily expansionist Qing was Tsarist Russia and their heirs, the New Tsars
of Soviet Russia, not the West. The invader that killed the most Chinese was
Hirohito’s Showa era Imperium, not the West. Sun Yat-sen’s nationalists took
as the people who had long humiliated the Han to be the Manchus, not the
West. It is the domestic political purposes of an anti-liberal CCP that leads
to a historical myth that demonises “the West.” 
Tucker shows how important it is to comprehend what governments get
wrong and why, such as missing early opportunities for the normalisation
of Washington-Beijing relations. While Mao’s China increasingly fixated on
the Soviet Union as Enemy Number One, the Eisenhower administration,
goaded by Chiang and the Republican Right, greatly “exaggerated the Chi-
nese menace” (p. 177). In contrast, Mao, by 1961, the year Eisenhower left
office, wanted to make overtures to Washington for an entente, according
to the director of the CCP archive, Hu Hua. 
Tucker’s study brilliantly explores how American domestic politics shaped
and delimited Eisenhower’s foreign policy choices. She seeks similar data
on China. She is wise to do so. To fill out the picture of USA-PRC relations,
analysts need access to Chinese archives that would reveal the forces at
work inside of CCP politics. Without that data, it is natural and misleading
to underestimate how domestic Chinese politics were, and still are, central
in shaping and informing CCP foreign policy choices.
z Edward Friedman is professor emeritus in the Department of
Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, where he
teaches Chinese foreign policy (efriedm1@wisc.edu).
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